Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century - Rivalry and Cooperation

9 The search for disarmament (p. 158-159)

Anglo-French relations, 1929–1934

Carolyn Kitching

The years 1929–34 marked a watershed in Anglo-French relations in the inter-war period. The close cooperation of the Chamberlain-Briand years dissolved under the impact of the World Depression, the revival of ultranationalism in Germany and the fundamental issues posed by the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva between 1932 and 1934. Since the Treaty of Versailles, Britain and France, sometimes reluctantly, sought to come to terms with the German problem by integrating Germany into a system of European or international security.

The British preferred a loose system, epitomised by the Treaty of Locarno, the French a tight system based on the League of Nations and their eastern alliances. The French rejection of further disarmament negotiations on 17 April 1934 marked the end of the quest to accommodate Germany and an overt return to traditional balance of power politics. Not surprisingly, it provoked a severe if temporary downturn in Anglo-French relations and encouraged a rapprochement between Britain and Germany. In essence, the Anglo-French relationship in the years 1929–1934 was acted out in public at Geneva, in the world disarmament negotiations.

The conference was the finale of one of the dramas which had been played since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles; the search for a multi-lateral disarmament agreement. There were, of course, many factors which influenced the steady decline in relations between the major powers, but the failure of the Disarmament Conference focused attention on the central issue of the inter-war years; the failure to solve the apparently insoluble equation of French security and German equality.

I

Disarmament became a priority in the search for security following the First World War because, in the eyes of many leading politicians, the arms-race itself was seen as the chief cause of the war. The search for a multi-lateral disarmament agreement officially began with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The Preamble to Part V of the Treaty, the Disarmament Clauses, declared that ‘in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow’.

In fact, Germany was allowed to retain an army of no more than 100,000 men, and was prohibited from possessing ‘aggressive weapons’ such as tanks, heavy guns over 105 mm, battleships over 10,000 tons, military aircraft, poison gas and submarines. The navy was restricted numerically to six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats, with a maximum personnel of 15,000; the general staff was abolished; the military training of civilians prohibited, and strict regulations applied to all military establishments.

When presented with these terms, the Germans asked for clarification of the Preamble. On behalf of the Allies, the French leader, Georges Clemenceau, replied that the Allied requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely ‘with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to renew her policy of military aggression’ but also as the first step ‘towards the general reduction and limitation of armaments’ which it was ‘one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote’.

However, a ‘general limitation of the armaments of all nations’ was infinitely more difficult to achieve than was the enforced disarmament of Germany, for whilst many of the peacemakers paid lip-service to the argument that the arms-race was a prime cause of the First World War, in their hearts they believed otherwise, namely that, ‘men do not fight because they have arms, they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight’.2 This argument emphasises the need for security and stability as a pre-requisite for any agreement to reduce the level of armaments and helps highlight one of the major dilemmas of the inter-war period.